Optimal Attack against Autoregressive Models by Manipulating the
  Environment by Chen, Yiding & Zhu, Xiaojin
Optimal Attack against Autoregressive Models by Manipulating the Environment
Yiding Chen, Xiaojin Zhu
Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison
{yiding, jerryzhu}@cs.wisc.edu
Abstract
We describe an optimal adversarial attack formulation against
autoregressive time series forecast using Linear Quadratic Reg-
ulator (LQR). In this threat model, the environment evolves
according to a dynamical system; an autoregressive model ob-
serves the current environment state and predicts its future val-
ues; an attacker has the ability to modify the environment state
in order to manipulate future autoregressive forecasts. The at-
tacker’s goal is to force autoregressive forecasts into tracking
a target trajectory while minimizing its attack expenditure. In
the white-box setting where the attacker knows the environ-
ment and forecast models, we present the optimal attack using
LQR for linear models, and Model Predictive Control (MPC)
for nonlinear models. In the black-box setting, we combine
system identification and MPC. Experiments demonstrate the
effectiveness of our attacks.
Introduction
Adversarial learning studies vulnerability in machine learn-
ing, see e.g. (Vorobeychik and Kantarcioglu 2018; Joseph
et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2017; Biggio and Roli 2017; Lowd
and Meek 2005). Understanding optimal attacks that might
be carried out by an adversary is important, as it prepares
us to manage the damage and helps us develop defenses.
Time series forecast, specifically autoregressive model, is
widely deployed in practice (Hamilton 1994; Box et al. 2015;
Fan and Yao 2008) but has not received the attention it de-
serves from adversarial learning researchers. Adversarial at-
tack in this context means an adversary can subtly perturb
a dynamical system at the current time, hence influencing
the forecasts about a future time. Prior work (Alfeld, Zhu,
and Barford 2016; Alfeld, Zhu, and Barford 2017) did point
out vulnerabilities in autoregressive models under very spe-
cific attack assumptions. However, it was not clear how to
formulate general attacks against autoregressive models.
There are extensive studies on batch adversarial attacks
against machine learning algorithms. But there is much less
work on sequential attacks. We say an attack is batch if the
attacker performs one attack action at training or test time
(the attacker is allowed to change multiple data points); an
attack is sequential if the attacker take actions over time.
There are batch attacks against support vector machine (Big-
gio, Nelson, and Laskov 2012; Biggio et al. 2014), deep
neural networks (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014;
Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune 2015), differentially-private
learners (Ma, Zhu, and Hsu 2019), contextual bandits (Ma et
al. 2018), recurrent neural networks (Papernot et al. 2016),
online learning (Wang and Chaudhuri 2018) and reinforce-
ment learning (Ma et al. 2019). Some of these victims are
sequential during deployment, but they can be trained from
batch offline data; hence they can be prone to batch attacks.
In contrast, (Jun et al. 2018) and (Zhang and Zhu 2019) study
sequential attacks against stochastic bandits and sequential
prediction. Our work studies sequential attack against autore-
gressive model, which is closer to these two papers. Mean-
while, control theory is receiving increasing attention from
the adversarial learning community (Recht 2018; Zhu 2018;
Lessard, Zhang, and Zhu 2018). Our work strengthens this
connection.
This paper makes three main contributions: (1) We present
an attack setting where the adversary must determine the at-
tack sequentially. This generalizes the setting of (Alfeld, Zhu,
and Barford 2016; Alfeld, Zhu, and Barford 2017), where
the adversary can decide the attack after observing all envi-
ronmental state values used for forecast. (2) We formulate
the attacks as an optimal control problem. (3) When the at-
tacker knows the environmental dynamics and forecast model
(white-box setting), we solve the optimal attacks with Lin-
ear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) for the linear case, or Model
Predictive Control (MPC) and iterative LQR (iLQR) for the
nonlinear case; when the attacker does not know the envi-
ronmental or forecaster(black-box setting), we additionally
perform system identification.
The Attack Setting
Autoregressive Review
To fix notation, we briefly review time series forecasting
using autoregressive models. There are two separate entities:
1. The environment is a fixed dynamical system with
scalar-valued states xt ∈ R at time t. The environment has a
(potentially non-linear) q-th order dynamics f and is subject
to zero-mean noise wt ∈ R with V(wt) = σ2. Without
manipulations from the adversary, the environmental state
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evolves as
xt+1 = f(xt, . . . , xt−q+1, wt) (1)
for t = 0, 1, . . .. We take the convention that xi = 0 if i < 0.
We allow the dynamics f to be either linear or nonlinear.
2. The forecaster makes predictions of future environmen-
tal states, and will be the victim of the adversary attack. In this
paper we mainly focus on a fixed linearAR(p) autoregressive
forecaster, regardless of whether the environment dynamics
f is linear or not. Even though we allow the forecast model
to be nonlinear in black-box setting, we use linear function
to approximate the nonlinear autoregressive model. We also
allow the possibility p 6= q. At time t, the forecaster observes
xt and uses the p most recent observations xt, . . . , xt−p+1
to forecast the future values of the environmental state. A
forecast is made at time t about a future time t′ > t, we use
the notation yt′|t to denote it.
Specifically, at time t the forecaster uses a standard AR(p)
model to predict. It initializes by setting yt+1−i|t = xt+1−i
for i = 1 . . . p. It then predicts the state at time t+ 1 by
yt+1|t = αˆ0 +
p∑
i=1
αˆiyt+1−i|t, (2)
where αˆ0, αˆ1, . . . , αˆp are coefficients of the AR(p) model.
We allow the AR(p) model to be a nonlinear function in the
black-box setting. TheAR(p) model may differ from the true
environment dynamics f even when f is linear: for example,
the forecaster may have only obtained an approximate model
from a previous learning phase. Once the forecaster predicts
yt+1|t, it can plug the predictive value in (2), shift time by
one, and predict yt+2|t, and so on. Note all these predictions
are made at time t. In the next iteration when the true environ-
ment state evolves to xt+1 and is observed by the forecaster,
the forecaster will make predictions yt+2|t+1, yt+3|t+1, and
so on.
The Attacker
We next introduce a third entity – an adversary (a.k.a. at-
tacker) – who wishes to control the forecaster’s predictions
for nefarious purposes. The threat model is characterized by
three aspects of the adversary:
(i) Knowledge: In the white-box setting, the attacker
knows everything above; in the black-box setting, neither
environmental dynamics nor forecaster model are known to
the attacker.
(ii) Goal: The adversary wants to force the forecaster’s pre-
dictions yt′|t to be close to some given adversarial reference
target y†t′|t (the dagger is a mnemonic for attack), for selected
pairs of (t, t′) of interest to the adversary. Furthermore, the
adversary wants to achieve this with “small attacks”. These
will be made precise below.
(iii) Action: At time t the adversary can add ut ∈ R (the
“control input”) to the noise wt. Together ut and wt enter the
environment dynamics via:
xt+1 = f(xt, . . . , xt−q+1, ut + wt). (3)
We call this the state attack because it changes the underlying
environmental states, see Figure 1.
xt−p+1 xt−p+2 xt xt+1
adversary
adversary
environment
forecaster
wt
ut
yt+1|t, yt+2|t, . . .
y†t+1|t, y
†
t+2|t, . . .
C
· · · · · · f · · ·
Figure 1: The state attack. The lowest layer depicts the attack
target, and the adversary compares it against the forecaster’s
predictions.
White-Box Attack as Optimal Control
We now present an optimal control formulation for the white-
box attack. Following control convention (Lee and Markus
1967; Kwakernaak and Sivan 1972), we rewrite several quan-
tities from the previous section in matrix form, so that we
can define the adversary’s state attack problem by the tuple
(F,C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T ). These quantities are defined
below.
We introduce a vector-valued environment state represen-
tation (denoted by boldface) xt := (1, xt, . . . , xt−p+1)> ∈
Rp+1. The first entry 1 serves as an offset for the con-
stant term αˆ0 in (2). We let x0 be the known initial state.
It is straightforward to generalize to an initial distribution
over x0, which adds an expectation in (9). We rewrite
the environment dynamics under adversarial control (3)
as xt+1 = F (xt, ut, wt) := (1, f(xt, . . . , xt−p+1, ut +
wt), xt, . . . , xt−p+2)>. If f is nonlinear, so is F .
In control language, the forecasts are essentially measure-
ments of the current state xt. In particular, we introduce a vec-
tor of p predictions made at time t about time t′−p+1, . . . , t′
as yt′|t := (1, yt′|t, yt′−1|t, . . . yt′−p+1|t)> ∈ Rp+1. (For
completeness, we let yt′|t = xt when t′ ≤ t.) The fore-
caster’s AR(p) forecast model specifies the (linear) mea-
surements as follows. We introduce the (p + 1) × (p + 1)
measurement (i.e. forecast) matrix 1 ,
C =

1 0 0 · · · 0 0
αˆ0 αˆ1 αˆ2 · · · αˆp−1 αˆp
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 0
 . (4)
1 The forecaster usually only has an estimate of f . It is likely
that the forecaster’s AR(p) model has a different order p than the
environment dynamics’ order q. For simplicity, we will assume
p = q below, but explain how to handle p 6= q in Appendix A.
Then the measurements / forecasts are:
yt′|t = Ct
′−txt, ∀t′ > t. (5)
There are cases that yt′|t does not depend on xt but has
been decided at time t˜ < t. In such cases, we can simply
redefine yt′|t to be yt′|t˜ and rewrite the prediction matrix. For
simplicity, we assume yt′|t always depends on xt in the rest
of the paper.
We also vectorize adversarial reference target: y†t′|t :=
(1, y†t′|t, y
†
t′−1|t, . . . y
†
t′−p+1|t)
> ∈ Rp+1. We simply let
y†t′|t = 0 when t
′ ≤ t: this is non-essential. In fact, for
(t, t′) pairs that are uninteresting to the adversary, the target
value y†t′|t can be undefined as they do not appear in the
control cost later.
The cost of the adversary consists of two parts: (1) how
closely the adversary can force the forecaster’s predictions to
match the adversarial reference targets; (2) how much control
ut the adversary has to exert. The (p+ 1)× (p+ 1) matrices
Qt′|t define the first part, namely the cost of the attacker
failing to achieve reference targets. In its simplest form, Qt′|t
is a (p+ 1)× (p+ 1) matrix with all zero entries except for a
scalar weight βt′|t ∈ [0, 1] at (2,2). In this case, Qt′|t simply
picks out the (t′ | t) element:
(yt′|t−y†t′|t)>Qt′|t(yt′|t−y†t′|t) = βt′|t(yt′|t−y†t′|t)2. (6)
For simplicity, we use ‖yt′|t − y†t′|t‖2Qt′|t to denote (6). Crit-
ically, by setting the weights βt′|t the attacker can express
different patterns of attack. For example:
• If βT |t = 1 for all t = 0 . . . T − 1 and 0 otherwise, the
adversary cares about the forecasts made at all times about
the final time horizon T . In this case, it is plausible that
the adversarial target y†T |t := y
†
T is a constant w.r.t. t.
• If βt+1|t = 1 for all t and 0 otherwise, the adversary cares
about all the forecasts about “tomorrow.”
• if βt′|t = 1,∀t, t′, the adversary cares about all predictions
made at all times.
Obviously, the adversary can express more complex temporal
attack patterns. The adversary can also choose βt′|t value in
between 0 and 1 to indicate weaker importance of certain
predictions.
The R matrix defines the second part of the adversary cost,
namely how much control expenditure ut the adversary has
to exert. In the simplest case, we let R be a scalar λ > 0:
‖ut‖2R := λu2t . (7)
We use T to denote the prediction time horizon: T is the
last time index (expressed by t′) to be predicted by the fore-
caster. We define the adversary’s expected quadratic cost
J(u0:(T−1)) for action sequence u0, . . . , uT−1 by
Ew0:(T−1)
[
T−1∑
t=1
T∑
t′=t+1
‖yt′|t − y†t′|t‖2Qt′|t+
T−1∑
t=0
‖ut‖2R
∣∣∣∣∣x0
]
.
Since the environment dynamics can be stochastic, the
adversary must seek attack policies φt : Rp+1 7→ R to map
the observed state xt to an attack action:
ut = φt(xt) ∀t. (8)
Given an adversarial state attack problem
(F,C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T ), we formulate the optimal state
attack as the following optimal control problem:
min
φ0,··· ,φT−1
J(u0:(T−1)) (9)
s.t.x0 given (10)
ut = φt(xt), t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 (11)
xt+1 = F (xt, ut, wt), t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 (12)
yt′|t = Ct
′−txt, ∀t′ > t. (13)
We next propose solutions to this control problem for linear
F and nonlinear F , respectively. For illustrative purpose, we
focus on solving the problem when the attack target is to
change predictions for “tomorrows”. This implies βt′|t = 0
when t′ ≥ t+ 2. Under this assumption, J(u0:(T−1)) has the
following form:
Ew0:(T−1)
[
T−1∑
t=1
‖Cxt − y†t+1|t‖2Qt+1|t +
T−1∑
t=0
‖ut‖2R
∣∣∣∣∣x0
]
.
More attack targets are studied in the experiment section.
Solving Attacks Under Linear F
When the environment dynamics f is linear, the scalar envi-
ronment state evolves as xt+1 = α0 +
∑p
i=1 αixt+1−i+ut+
wt,where the coefficients α0, . . . , αp in general can be dif-
ferent from the forecaster’s AR(p) model (2). We introduce
the corresponding vector operation
xt+1 = F (xt, ut, wt) := Axt +B(ut + wt), (14)
where A has the same structure as C in (4) except each αˆ is
replaced by α, and B = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)>. The adversary’s
attack problem (9) reduces to stochastic Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) with tracking, which is a fundamental prob-
lem in control theory (Kwakernaak and Sivan 1972). It is
well known that such problems have a closed-form solution,
though the specific solution for stochastic tracking is often
omitted from the literature. In addition, the presence of a fore-
caster in our case alters the form of the solution. Therefore,
for completeness we provide the solution in Algorithm 1.
The derivation is in Appendix. Once the adversarial con-
trol policies are computed, the optimal attack sequence is
given by: ut = φt(xt), t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. The astute
reader will notice that, uT−1 = φT−1(xT−1) = 0. This is
to be expected: uT−1 affects xT , but xT would only affect
forecasts after the prediction time horizon T , which the ad-
versary does not care. To minimize the control expenditure,
the adversary’s rational behavior is to set uT−1 = 0.
Solving Attacks Under Non-Linear F
When f is nonlinear the optimal control problem (9) in gen-
eral does not have a closed-form solution. Instead, we in-
troduce an algorithm that combines Model Predictive Con-
trol (MPC) (Garcia, Prett, and Morari 1989; Kouvaritakis
Algorithm 1: LQR(F,C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T )
Input :(F,C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T )
1 PT = 0;
2 qT = 0;
3 for t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 do
4 Pt =
CA>Qt+1|tC +A>(I + 1λPt+1BB
>)−1Pt+1A;
5 qt = −2C>Qt+1|ty†t+1|t +A>qt+1 −
1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>qt+1;
6 end
7 for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
8 φt(z) = −B
>qt+1+2B>Pt+1Az
2(λ+B>Pt+1B)
9 end
Output :φ0(·), . . . , φT−1(·)
and Cannon 2015) as the outer loop and Iterative Linear
Quadratic Regulator (ILQR) (Li and Todorov 2004) as the
inner loop to find an approximately optimal attack. While
these techniques are standard in the control community, to
our knowledge our algorithm is a novel application of the
techniques to adversarial learning.
The outer loop performs MPC, a common heuristic in non-
linear control. At each time τ = 0, 1, . . ., MPC performs
planning by starting at xτ , looking ahead l steps and finding
a good control sequence {φt}τ+l−1t=τ . However, MPC then car-
ries out only the first control action u∗τ . This action, together
with the actual noise instantiation wτ , drives the environment
state to xτ+1 = F (xτ , u∗τ , wτ ). Then, MPC performs the l-
step planning again but starting at xτ+1, and again carries out
the first control action u∗τ+1. This process repeats. Formally,
MPC iterates two steps: at time τ
1. Solve
min
φτ:L(τ)
E
L(τ)+1∑
t=τ+1
‖Cxt − y†t+1|t‖2Qt+1|t +
L(τ)∑
t=τ
‖φt(xt)‖2R
s.t.xτ given
xt+1 = F (xt, φt(ut), wt), t = τ, · · · , L(τ), (15)
The expectation is over wτ , · · · , wL(τ). Denote the solu-
tion by {φt}L(τ)t=τ .
2. Apply u∗τ = φτ (xτ ) to the F system.
L(τ) = min(τ+l−1, T−2), which indicates that the size
of the optimization in step 1 will decrease as τ approaches T .
The repeated re-planning allows MPC to adjust to new inputs,
and provides some leeway if {φt}L(τ)t=τ cannot be exactly
solved, which is the case for our nonlinear F .
We now turn to the inner loop to approximately solve (15).
There are two issues that make the problem hard: the ex-
pectation over noises Ewτ ,··· ,wL(τ) , and the nonlinear F . To
address the first issue, we adopt an approximation technique
known as “nominal cost” in (Kouvaritakis and Cannon 2015).
For planning we simply replace the random variables w with
their mean, which is zero in our case. This heuristic removes
the expectation, and we are left with the following determin-
istic system as an approximation to (15):
min
uτ ,··· ,uL(τ)
L(τ)+1∑
t=τ+1
‖Cxt − y†t+1|t‖2Qt+1|t +
L(τ)∑
t=τ
‖ut‖2R
s.t.xτ given
xt+1 = F (xt, ut, 0), t = τ, · · · , L(τ). (16)
To address the second issue, we adopt ILQR (Li and
Todorov 2004) in order to solve (35). The idea of ILQR
is to linearize the system around a trajectory, and compute
an improvement to the control sequence using LQR itera-
tively. We show the details in Appendix. We summarize the
MPC+ILQR attack in Algorithm 2 and 3.
Algorithm 2: MPC
Input :F,C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T, l,maxiter, tol
1 for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 do
Input :xt
2 ut:min(t+l−1,T−2) ←
ILQR(xt, F, C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R,min(t+ l +
1, T ),maxiter, tol);
Output :ut
3 end
A Greedy Control Policy as the Baseline State
Attack Strategy
The optimal state attack objective (9) can be rewritten as a
running sum of instantaneous costs. At time t = 0, 1, . . . the
instantaneous cost involves the adversary’s control expendi-
ture u2t , the attack’s immediate effect on the environment state
xt+1 (see Figure 1), and consequently on all the forecaster’s
predictions made at time t+1 about time t+2, . . . , T . Specif-
ically, the expected instantaneous cost gt(xt, ut) at time t is
defined as:
Ewt‖CF (xt, ut, wt)− y†t+2|t+1‖2Qt+2|t+1 + ‖ut‖2R. (17)
This allows us to define a greedy control policy φG, which is
easy to compute and will serve as a baseline for state attacks.
In particular, the greedy control policy at time t minimizes
the instantaneous cost:
φGt (xt) ∈ argminugt(xt, u).
When F is linear, φGt (·) can be obtained in closed-form. We
show the solution in Appendix D.
When f is nonlinear, we let noise wt = 0 and solve the
following nonlinear problem using numerical solvers:
min
ut
‖CF (xt, ut, 0)− y†t+2|t+1‖2Qt+2|t+1 + ‖ut‖2R. (18)
Black-Box Attack via System Identification
We now consider black-box attack setting where the envi-
ronment dynamics f and forecaster’s model C are no longer
Algorithm 3: ILQR
Input :x0, F, C, {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R, T,maxiter, tol
1 Initialize u0:T−2;
2 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,maxiter do
3 for t = 0 : T − 2 do
4 xt+1 = F (xt, ut, 0);
5 DuFt = DuF (xt, ut, 0);
6 DxFt = DxF (xt, ut, 0)
7 end
8 PT−1 = C>QT |T−1C;
9 qT−1 = 2C>QT |T−1(CxT−1 − y†T |T−1);
10 for s = T − 2, . . . , 1 do
11 Ps = C
>Qs+1|sC +DxF>s (I +
1
λPs+1DuFsDuF
>
s )
−1Ps+1DxF>s ;
12 qs =
2C>Qs+1|s(Cxs − y†s+1|s) +DxF>s qs+1 −
(DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFs)
>(DuF>s qs+1+2λus)
λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs
13 end
14 for s = 0, T − 2 do
15 δus = − 2DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFsδxs+DuF
>
s qs+1+2λus
2(λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs)
;
16 δxs+1 = DxFsδxs +DuFsδus
17 end
18 if ‖δu0:T−2‖2/(T − 1) < tol then
19 Break;
20 end
21 u0:T−2 ← u0:T−2 + δu0:T−2;
22 end
Output :u0:T−2
known to the attacker. Both the environment forecast models
are allowed to be nonlinear. The attacker will perform system
identification (Dean et al. 2017), and solve LQR as an inner
loop and MPC as an outer loop.
The attacks picks an estimation model order p for both the
environment and forecaster. It also picks a buffer length b. In
the first b+ p− 1 iterations, the attacker does no attack but
collects observations on the free-evolving environment and
the forecasts. Then, in each subsequent iteration the attacker
estimates a linear environmental model aˆ and linear forecast
model cˆ using a rolling buffer of previous b+p−1 iterations.
The buffer produces b data points for the attacker to use MLE
to solve p+ 1 unknowns in environment model.The attacker
then uses MPC and LQR to design an attack action.
The attacker use linear models to estimate both the
environmental dynamics and forecast model. At time t,
he environmental dynamics is estimated over the environ-
mental state value xt−b−p+1, . . . , xt and action sequences
ut−b, . . . , ut−1:
min
a0:p
t−1∑
t=t−b
(a0 +
p∑
i=1
aixt+1−i + ut − xt+1)2, (19)
we use aˆ(t, b), a p+ 1-dimensional column vector to denote
the minimum point of (19). Due to the nature of attacking
autoregressive models, B = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)> ∈ R(p+1)×1 is
always known to the attacker.
We use cˆ0, cˆ1, . . . , cˆp to denote the estimation of forecast
model and let
C(cˆ0:p) =

1 0 0 · · · 0 0
cˆ0 cˆ1 cˆ2 · · · cˆp−1 cˆp
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 0
 . (20)
to denote the corresponding forecast matrix. Let Λ(t1, t2)
denote the set of prediction indices which are visible
to the attacker: Λ(t1, t2) = {(t, t′) | t1 ≤ t ≤
t2, yt′|t is visible to the attacker}. At time t, the forecast
model is estimated over the visible forecasts: yt′|t, (t, t′) ∈
Λ(t− b, t):
min
c0:p
∑
(t,t′)∈Λ(t−b,t)
(B>Ct
′−txt − yt′|t)2, (21)
we use cˆ(t, b), a p+ 1-dimensional column vector to denote
the minimum point of (21). If the attacker only observes suf-
ficient predictions for “tomorrows”, i.e. Λ(t1, t2) = {(t, t′) |
t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, t′ = t + 1}, then cˆ0, cˆ1, . . . , cˆp is the OLS
solution to (21). However, for more complex prediction pat-
tern, (21) might involve polynomials of c0, c1, . . . , cp.
We can summarize the proposed black-box attack method
in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: System identification attack
Input :model order p, buffer size b, time step of MPC l
1 for t = 0, 1, . . . , b+ p− 2 do
Input :xt, yt′|t
Output :ut = 0
2 end
3 for t = b+ p− 1, . . . , T − 1 do
4 update aˆ(t, b) by (19);
5 update cˆ(t, b) by (21);
6 φ0:min(t+l,T )−1 ←
LQR({aˆ(t, b), B}, C(cˆ(t, b)), {y†t′|t}, {Qt′|t}, R,
min(t+ l + 1, T )− t);
Output :ut ← φ0(xt)
Input :xt+1, yt′|t
7 end
Experiments
We now demonstrate the effectiveness of control-based white-
box attacks on time series forecast problems. We compare the
optimal attacks computed by LQR (for linear f ), MPC+iLQR
(for nonlinear f ), black-box attack, greedy attacks, and the
no-attack baseline. While the attack actions were optimized
under an expectation over random noise w (c.f. (9)), in the
experiments we report the actual realized cost based on the
noise instantiation that the algorithm experienced:
T−1∑
t=1
T∑
t′=t+1
‖Ct′−txt − y†t′|t‖2Qt′|t +
T−1∑
t=0
‖ut‖2R (22)
where the noise sequence {wt}T−2t=0 is incorporated im-
plicitly in xt, together with the actual attack sequence
{ut}T−1t=0 . To make the balance between attack effect (the
quadratic terms involving Q) and control expenditure (the
term involving R) more interpretable, we let R := λ =
λ˜
∑T−1
t=1
∑T
t′=t+1 βt′|t/T
The Effect of Qt′|t on Attack
In our first synthetic example we demonstrate the adver-
sary’s ability to target different parts of the forecasts via
Q, the quadratic coefficient in cost function. Figure 2 illus-
trates three choices of attack targets Q: attack “tomorrow”,
“last day” and “all predictions”.
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Figure 2: LQR solution on three attack patterns Q. y-axis
shows the value of x and u. Each blue forecast curve begin-
ning at time t shows the sequence {yt′|t−1}Tt′=t. The pattern
of attack defined by the corresponding Q is highlighted with
∗ on the forecast curves.
For simplicity, we let all adversarial reference targets y†t′|t
be the constant 1. We let the environment evolve according to
an AR(1) model: xt+1 = 1 + 0.5xt + wt. We let the noise
wt ∼ N(0, 0.12) and the initial state x0 = 0. We simulate
the case where the forecaster has only an approximation of
the environment dynamics, and let the forecaster’s model be
xt+1 = 0.9 + 0.6xt which is close to, but different from,
the environment dynamics. For illustrative purpose, we set
the prediction time horizon T = 10. Recall that the attacker
can change the environment state by adding perturbation ut:
xt+1 = 1 + 0.5xt + ut + wt. We set λ˜ = 0.1.
We run LQR and compute the optimal attack sequences
u under each Q scenario. They are visualized in Figure 2.
Each attack is effective: the blue *’s are closer to the green
target line on average, compared to where they would be in
the upper-left no-attack panel. Different target selection Q
will affect the optimal attack sequence.
Comparing LQR vs. Greedy Attack Policies
We now show the LQR attack policy is better than the
greedy attack policy. We let the environment evolves by
an AR(3) model: xt+1 = f(xt, xt−1, xt−2, wt) = 0.4xt −
0.3xt−1−0.7xt−2+wt ,wt ∼ N(0, 0.12). The initial values
are x0 = 10, x−1 = x−2 = 0, prediction horizon T = 15.
This environment dynamic is oscillating around 0.
We let the forecaster’s model be: xt+1 = 0.41xt −
0.29xt−1− 0.68xt−2. Q is ”tomorrows”. The attacker wants
the forecaster to predict a sequence oscillating with smaller
amplitude. y†t+1|t is set as following: we simulate xt+1 =
f(xt, xt−1, xt−2, 0), then, let the attack reference target be
y†t|t−1 = 0.5xt, t = 2, · · · , T . We set λ˜ = 0.1.
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Figure 3: LQR vs. Greedy attacks. The black horizontal lines
in the right plot mark the vertical axis range of the middle
plot.
We run LQR and Greedy, respectively, to solve this at-
tacking problem. We generate 50 trials with different noise
sequences, see Figure 3. Interestingly, LQR drives the pre-
dictions close to the attack target, while Greedy diverges.
The mean actual realized cost of no attack, LQR attack and
Greedy attack are 133.9, 11.5, 1492, respectively. The stan-
dard errors are 1.20, 0.02, 12.99. We perform a paired t-test
on LQR vs. Greedy. The null hypothesis of equal mean is
rejected with p = 4 × 10−61. This clearly demonstrate the
myopic failure of the greedy policy.
MPC+ILQR attack on US Real GNP
This real world data (Tiao and Tsay 1994) models the growth
rate of quarterly US real GNP from the first quarter of 1947
to the first quarter of 1991. We use the GNP data to evaluate
MPC+iLQR and Greedy, which attack the “last day.” The
environment’s nonlinear threshold model dynamics is:
xt+1 =

−0.015− 1.076xt + w1,t (xt, xt−1) ∈ X1
−0.006 + 0.630xt − 0.756xt−1 + w2,t (xt, xt−1) ∈ X2
0.006 + 0.438xt + w3,t (xt, xt−1) ∈ X3
0.004 + 0.443xt + w4,t (xt, xt−1) ∈ X4,
where X1 = {(xt, xt−1) | xt ≤ xt−1 ≤ 0}, X2 =
{(xt, xt−1) | xt > xt−1, xt−1 ≤ 0}, X3 = {(xt, xt−1) |
xt ≤ xt−1, xt−1 > 0}, X4 = {(xt, xt−1) | xt > xt−1 >
0}, w1,t ∼ N(0, 0.00622), w2,t ∼ N(0, 0.01322), w3,t ∼
N(0, 0.00942), w4,t ∼ N(0, 0.00822). We let T = 10,
x0 = 0.0065 (according to (Tiao and Tsay 1994)), x−1 = 0.
The forecaster’s model is xt+1 = 0.0041+0.33xt+0.13xt−1
(according to (Tiao and Tsay 1994)). The attacker can change
state value by adding perturbation. The attack target is to
drive forecaster’s predictions yT |t, t = 1, · · · , T − 1 to be
close to 0.01. We let λ˜ = 0.001. MPC+iLQR and Greedy are
used to solve this problem. The time step of MPC is set to be
l = 5. Inside the MPC loop, the stopping condition of iLQR
is tol = 10−4. The maximum iteration of iLQR is set to be
1000. For Greedy, we use the default setting for the lsqnonlin
solver in Matlab (Coleman, Branch, and Grace 1999) except
that we do provide the gradients
We again run 50 trials, the last one is shown in Figure 4.
The mean actual realized cost of no attack, MPC+iLQR attack
and Greedy attack are (6.87, 3.03, 3.23)× 10−4 respectively.
The standard errors are (1.40, 0.18, 0.19)×10−5 respectively.
The null hypothesis of equal mean is rejected with p = 6×
10−65 by a paired t-test. As an interesting observation, in the
beginning MPC+iLQR adopts a larger attack than Greedy; at
time t = 4, MPC+iLQR adopts a smaller attack than Greedy,
but drives yT |5 closer to 0.01. This shows the advantage of
looking into future. Since Greedy only focus on current time,
it ignores how the attack will affect the future.
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Figure 4: MPC+iLQR and Greedy attack on GNP data.
MPC+iLQR: u4 = 0.0590, yT |5 = 0.0084; Greedy: u4 =
0.0719, yT |5 = 0.0079. x
†
T |5 = 0.01.
Using System Identification in Black-box Attack
We now show system identification can perform black-
box attack effectively. We compare the system identification
attack to an oracle, who has full information of both the
environmental dynamics and forecast model. The oracle use
MPC+ILQR to attack the forecast.
We use the same dynamic in (Fan and Yao 2008) but we
change the noise to be wt ∼ N(0, 0.12). The dynamic is
xt+1 = 2xt/(1 + 0.8x
2
t ) + wt. We let x0 = 3, T = 50. We
simulate this dynamical system to t = 50 and get a sample se-
quence from this dynamical system. The forecaster’s AR(1)
model C is estimated from this sequence. We introduce an at-
tacker who can add perturbation ut to change the state value:
xt+1 = 2xt/(1 + 0.8x
2
t ) + ut + wt. Q is “tomorrow”. The
attack target is set to be y†t+1|t = 2. We let λ˜ = 0.01.
Both the attacker and the oracle do nothing but observe
the xt and yt′|t at time t = 0, . . . , b + p − 2, and attack
the forecast at time t = b + p − 1, . . . , T − 2. For system
identification, we let b = 15, l = 5, p = 3. For the oracle,
the time step of MPC is set to be l = 10. Inside the MPC
loop, the stopping condition of ILQR is tol = 10−4. The
maximum iteration of iLQR is set to be 1000.
We run 100 trials, the last one is shown in Figure 5. The
mean actual realized cost of system identification attack and
oracle MPC+ILQR attack are 4.20, 1.43 respectively. Even
though the cost of System identification attack is larger than
that of the oracle, it is evident from Figure 5 that the attacker
can quickly force the forecasts (blue) to the attack target
(green) after t=25; the chaotic period between t=20 and t=25
is the price to pay for system identification.
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Figure 5: System identification and MPC+ILQR oracle attack
Conclusion
In this paper we formulated adversarial attacks on autoregres-
sive model as optimal control. This sequential attack problem
differs significantly from most of the batch attack work in
adversarial machine learning. In the white-box setting, we
obtained closed-form LQR solutions when the environment
is linear, and good MPC approximations when the environ-
ment is nonlinear. In the black-box setting, we propose a
method via system identification then perform MPC. We
demonstrated their effectiveness on synthetic and real data.
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Appendices
A. When p 6= q
For the case when p 6= q, we simply inflate the vector di-
mension. We use max(p, q) + 1 dimensional vectors to unify
environment model and forecaster’s model. Specifically, we
redefine the following vectors:
xt :=(1, xt, . . . , xt−max(p,q)+1)> ∈ Rmax(p,q)+1 (23)
xˆt′|t :=(1, xˆt′|t, xˆt′−1|t, . . . xˆt′−max(p,q)+1|t)> (24)
∈ Rmax(p,q)+1 (25)
x¯t′|t :=(1, x¯t′|t, x¯t′−1|t, . . . x¯t′−max(p,q)+1|t)> (26)
∈ Rmax(p,q)+1 (27)
and rewrite the environment dynam-
ics as: xt+1 = F (xt, ut, wt) :=
(1, f(xt, . . . , xt−q+1, ut, wt), xt, . . . , xt−max(p,q)+2)>.
Then, redefine C to be the following (max(p, q) + 1) ×
(max(p, q) + 1) matrix:
C =

1 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0
αˆ0 αˆ1 αˆ2 · · · αˆp · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 0

. (28)
Thereafter, we can apply LQR for linear f and iLQR for non-
linear f . For linear f ,Pt are (max(p, q)+1)×(max(p, q)+1)
and qt are (max(p, q) + 1)× 1.
B. Derivation for Algorithm 1
Theorem 1. Under F (xt, ut, wt) = Axt +B(ut +wt) and
βt′|t = 0 when t′ ≥ t+ 2, the optimal control policy is given
by:
φt(z) = −B
>qt+1 + 2B>Pt+1Az
2(λ+B>Pt+1B)
, t = 0 . . . T − 1.
(29)
The (p+ 1)× (p+ 1) matrices Pt and (p+ 1)× 1 vectors qt
are computed recursively by a generalization of the Riccati
equation:
PT =0 (30)
qT =0 (31)
for t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 :
Pt =CA
>Qt+1|tC +A>(I +
1
λ
Pt+1BB
>)−1Pt+1A
(32)
qt =− 2C>Qt+1|ty†t+1|t +A>qt+1
− 1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>qt+1. (33)
This problem can be viewed as an LQR tracking problem
with a more complicated cost function and we will show a
dynamic programming approach. Proof:
We will remove the assumption about βt′|t and give a more
general derivation to prove the theorem. It will be straightfor-
ward to obtain the exact result in the theorem once we finish
the derivation without the assumption about βt′|t.
The dynamic programming has the following steps:
1. Construct value function sequence Vt(·), for t =
0, 1, · · · , T , which can be used to represent the objective
function;
2. Solve {Vt(·)}Tt=0 and the optimal policy {φt(·)}T−1t=0 by
backward recursion.
We will show the detail below: We first define the value
function: for t = 0, 1, · · · , T , Vt(z) is:
min
ut,··· ,uT−1
E
T∑
τ=t
T∑
τ ′=τ+1
‖Cτ ′−τxτ−y†τ ′|τ‖2Qτ′|τ +λ
T−1∑
τ=t
u2τ
where expectation is over wt, w1, · · · , wT−1 given xt = z.
For completeness, Qt′|0 is defined to be 0. Then V0(x0) is
the optimal value of objective function. Vt(z) can be found
by a backward induction. Note that Vt(z) should always be a
quadratic function in z. We will show that:
Vt(z) = z
>Ptz + z>qt + rt t = 0, 1, · · · , T
where Pt is symmetric and positive semi-definite (p.s.d.).
VT (z) = 0 can be viewed as a quadratic function with
PT = 0,qT = 0, rT = 0, PT is symmetric and p.s.d.;
If Vt+1(z) = z>Pt+1z + z>qt+1 + rt+1 and Pt+1 is
p.s.d., we want to show that Vt(z) has the same form. By
the definition of the value function, we have the following
recursive formula for Vt(·):
Vt(z) =
T∑
τ ′=t+1
‖Cτ ′−tz− y†τ ′|t‖2Qτ′|t
+ min
v
(
λv2 + EwtVt+1(Az +Bv +Bwt)
)
Thus,
Vt(z) = z
>(
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ ′|tCτ
′−t +A>Pt+1A)z
+ z>(−2
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +A
>qt+1)
+ (
T∑
τ ′=t+1
y†>τ ′|tQτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +B
>Pt+1Bσ2 + rt+1)
+ min
v
((λ+B>Pt+1B)v2 + (B>qt+1 + 2B>Pt+1Az)v).
Since Pt+1 is p.s.d., λ+B>Pt+1B ≥ λ > 0. Thus, we can
solve for the minimum w.r.t. v and obtain the optimal policy
function:
v∗ = φt(z) = −B
>qt+1 + 2B>Pt+1Az
2(λ+B>Pt+1B)
. (34)
Substitute v in Vt(z) with v∗ above and we can rewrite Vt(z)
as a quadratic function in z:
Vt(z) = z
>(
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ ′|tCτ
′−t +A>Pt+1A
− 1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>Pt+1A)z
+ z>(−2
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +A
>qt+1
− 1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>qt+1)
+ (
T∑
τ ′=t+1
y†>τ ′|tQτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +B
>Pt+1Bσ2 + rt+1
+
q>t+1BB
>qt+1
4(λ+B>Pt+1B)
)
Thus we obtain the following recursive formula for Pt,qt, rt:
Pt =
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ
′−t
τ ′|t +A
>Pt+1A
− 1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>Pt+1A
qt =− 2
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +A
>qt+1
− 1
λ+B>Pt+1B
A>P>t+1BB
>qt+1
rt =
T∑
τ ′=t+1
y†>τ ′|tQτ ′|ty
†
τ ′|t +B
>Pt+1Bσ2 + rt+1
+
q>t+1BB
>qt+1
4(λ+B>Pt+1B)
By matrix inversion lemma, Pt can be rewritten as:
T∑
τ ′=t+1
(Cτ
′−t)>Qτ
′−t
τ ′|t +A
>(I +
1
λ
Pt+1BB
>)−1Pt+1A.
It’s obvious that if Pt+1 is symmetric and p.s.d., so is Pt.
Now, we have completed the backward induction and ob-
tain the optimal control policy φt(·).
C. ILQR
The problem to be solved is
min
uτ ,··· ,uL(τ)
L(τ)+1∑
t=τ+1
‖Cxt − y†t+1|t‖2Qt+1|t +
L(τ)∑
t=τ
‖ut‖2R
(35)
s.t.xτ given
xt+1 = F (xt, ut, 0), t = τ, · · · , L(τ). (36)
Concretely, given xτ we initialize the control sequence in
some heuristic manner: u˜τ , u˜τ+1, · · · , u˜L(τ). If there is not
good initialization for the control sequence, just set it to 0.
We then simulate the F system in (36) using u˜ to obtain a
state sequence x˜τ , x˜τ+1, · · · , x˜L(τ)+1:
x˜τ = xτ , x˜t+1 = F (x˜t, u˜t, 0), t = τ, τ+1, · · · , L(τ).
(37)
While (x˜, u˜) may not be sensible themselves, they allow us
to perform a first order Taylor expansion of the nonlinear
dynamics F around them:
xt+1 ≈ F (x˜t, u˜t, 0) +DxF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)(xt − x˜t)
+DuF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)(ut − u˜t) t = τ, τ + 1, · · · , L(τ),
(38)
where DxF (x˜t, u˜t, 0) and DuF (x˜t, u˜t, 0) are (p+1)× (p+
1) and (p+ 1)× 1 Jacobian matrices:
DxF =

0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 ∂f
∂xt
∂f
∂xt−1 · · ·
∂f
∂xt−p+2
∂f
∂xt−p+1
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 0

DuF (x˜t, u˜t, 0) = (0,
∂f
∂u
, 0, · · · , 0)>.
Note F (x˜t, u˜t, 0) = x˜t+1 by definition. Rearranging and
introducing new variables δxt := xt − x˜t, δut := ut − u˜t,
we have the relation
δxt+1 ≈ DxF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)δxt +DuF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)δut (39)
where t = τ, τ + 1, · · · , L(τ). We now further approx-
imate (35) by substituting the variables and making (39)
equality constraints:
min
δuτ:L(τ)
L(τ)+1∑
t=τ+1
‖C(δxt + x˜t)− y†t+1|t‖2Qt+1|t
+
L(τ)∑
t=τ
‖δut + u˜t‖2R (40)
s.t.δxτ = 0
δxt+1 = DxF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)δxt +DuF (x˜t, u˜t, 0)δut.
The solutions δu are then applied as an improvement to
u˜τ , u˜τ+1, · · · , u˜L(τ). We now have an updated (hopefully
better) heuristic control sequence u˜. We take u˜ and iterate
the inner loop starting from (37) for further improvement.
Critically, what enables iLQR is the fact that (40) is now
an LQR problem (i.e., linear) with a closed-form solution.
We show the solution in the following.
Theorem 2. In the following, denote DuFs =
DuF (x˜s, u˜s, 0), DxFs = DxF (x˜s, u˜s, 0). The opti-
mal solution of the LQR problem in each ILQR iteration is
given by: for s = τ, · · · , L(τ)
δu∗s = −
2DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFsδxs +DuF
>
s qs+1 + 2λu˜s
2(λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs)
δxs+1 = DxFsδxs +DuFsδu
∗
s,
where δxτ = 0. The Ps,qs sequences are computed by:
PL(τ)+1 =C
>QL(τ)+2|L(τ)+1C
qL(τ)+1 =2C
>QL(τ)+2|L(τ)+1(Cx˜L(τ)+1 − y†L(τ)+2|L(τ)+1)
for s = L(τ), L(τ)− 1, · · · , τ
Ps =C
>Qs+1|sC
+DxF
>
s (I +
1
λ
Ps+1DuFsDuF
>
s )
−1Ps+1DxF>s
qs =2C
>Qs+1|s(Cx˜s − y†s+1|s) +DxF>s qs+1
− (DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFs)
>(DuF>s qs+1 + 2λu˜s)
λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs
.
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 but there is
not noise involved. We will again derive without the assump-
tion about βt′|t.
We first define the value function: for s = τ, τ +
1, · · · , L(τ) + 1, Vs(z) is:
min
δus,··· ,δuL(τ)
L(τ)+1∑
t=s
T∑
t′=t+1
‖Ct′−t(δxt + x˜t)− y†t′|t‖2Qt′|t
+ λ
L(τ)∑
t=s
(δut + ut)
2
subject to δxs = z. For completeness, Qt′|τ is defined to
be 0. Then Vτ (0) is optimal value for the objective function.
Vs(z) can be found by a backward induction. Note that Vs(z)
should always be a quadratic function in z. We will show
that:
Vs(z) = z
>Psz+ z>qs + rs s = τ, τ + 1, · · · , L(τ) + 1
(41)
where Ps is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
First, VL(τ)+1(z) =
∑T
t′=L(τ)+2 ‖Ct
′−(L(τ)+1)(z +
x˜L(τ)+1)−y†t′|L(τ)+1‖2Qt′|L(τ)+1 is a quadratic function with
PL(τ)+1 =
T∑
t′=L(τ)+2
(Ct
′−(L(τ)+1))>Qt′|L(τ)+1Ct
′−(L(τ)+1)
qL(τ)+1 =2
T∑
t′=L(τ)+2
(Ct
′−(L(τ)+1))>Qt′|L(τ)+1
· (Ct′−(L(τ)+1)x˜L(τ)+1 − y†t′|L(τ)+1)
rL(τ)+1 =
T∑
t′=L(τ)+2
(Ct
′−(L(τ)+1)x˜L(τ)+1 − y†t′|L(τ)+1)>
·Qt′|L(τ)+1(Ct
′−(L(τ)+1)x˜L(τ)+1 − y†t′|L(τ)+1).
Assume Vs+1(z) = z>Ps+1z + z>qs+1 + rs+1, we can
write down Vs(z),
Vs(z) =
T∑
t′=s+1
‖Ct′−s(z + x˜s)− y†t′|s‖2Qt′|s
+ min
v
(λ(v + u˜s)
2 + Vs+1(DxFsz +DuFsv))
=
T∑
t′=s+1
‖Ct′−s(z + x˜s)− y†t′|s‖2Qt′|s
+ (DxFsz)
>Ps+1(DxFsz) + (DxFsz)>qs+1
+ λu˜2s + rs+1 + min
v
((λ+DuF
>
s Ps+1DuFs)v
2
+ (2DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFsz +DuF
>
s qs+1 + 2λu˜s)v).
The optimal control signal is:
δu∗s = v
∗ = −2DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFsz +DuF
>
s qs+1 + 2λu˜s
2(λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs)
.
(42)
Substitute v in Vs(z) with the equation above, we get:
Ps =
T∑
t′=s+1
(Ct
′−s)>Qt′|s(Ct
′−s) +DxF>s Ps+1DxFs
− (DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFs)
>DuF>s Ps+1DxFs
λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs
qs =2
T∑
t′=s+1
(Ct
′−s)>Qt′|s(Ct
′−sx˜s − y†t′|s) +DxF>s qs+1
− (DuF
>
s Ps+1DxFs)
>(DuF>s qs+1 + 2λu˜s)
λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs
rs =
T∑
t′=s+1
(Ct
′−sx˜s − y†t′|s)>Qt′|s(Ct
′−sx˜s − y†t′|s) + λu˜2s
+ rs+1 − (DuF
>
s qs+1 + 2λu˜s)
>DuF>s qs+1 + 2λu˜s
4(λ+DuF>s Ps+1DuFs)
.
By matrix inversion lemma, we can rewrite Ps as:
T∑
t′=s+1
(Ct
′−s)>Qt′|s(Ct
′−s)
+DxF
>
s (I +
1
λ
Ps+1DuFsDuF
>
s )
−1Ps+1DxF>s
It’s obvious that if Ps+1 is symmetric and p.s.d., so is Ps.
D. Greedy Policy When F is Linear
The greedy control policies at time t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 are
φGt (xt) = −
(CB)>Qt+2|t+1(CAxt − y†t+2|t+1)
λ+ (CB)>Qt+2|t+1(CB)
. (43)
When t = T − 1, QT |T−1 is 0 and φGT−1(xT−1) = 0. This
proof is to solve the minimum of a quadratic function. We
will again given a more general derivation.
We start with
Ewt
T∑
t′=t+2
‖Ct′−(t+1)(Axt +But +Bwt)− y†t′|t+1‖2Qt′|t+1
+ λu2t
=T∑
t′=t+2
‖Ct′−(t+1)(Axt +But)− y†t′|t+1‖2Qt′|t+1 + λu2t
+
T∑
t′=t+2
‖Ct′−(t+1)B‖2Qt′|t+1σ2.
Since the last summation is constant w.r.t. ut,
uGt = φ
G
t (xt)
=−
∑T
t′=t+2(C
t′−(t+1)B)>Qt′|t+1(Ct
′−(t+1)Axt − y†t′|t+1)
λ+
∑T
t′=t+2(C
t′−(t+1)B)>Qt′|t+1(Ct
′−(t+1)B)
The last equality is because λ > 0 and Qt′|t is p.s.d. for all
(t, t′) pairs in the sum.
